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LEASING REAL ESTATE- TAX ASPECTS
Leasing Real Estate:
Some Income Tax Aspects'
Zolman Cavitch
THE LANDLORD-TENANT relationship usually presents a variety
of income tax problems. Some of those problems have dear, unequivocal
answers; some can be answered with a large measure of what one famous
jurist called the "visceral" approach. All of them have this one charac-
teristic in common -t hey are problems which the attorney faces many
times -in his practice. The
purpose of -this artide is
TMt AUTHOR (A.B., 1948, J.D., 1950, Uni- to review briefly the in-
versity of Michigan), is a Lecturer in Law,
Western Reserve University, and is a partner in come tax pitfalls and op-
the law firm of Grossman, Schlesinger & Carter, portunities in three se-
Cleveland, Ohio. lected areas of real estate
leasing.
A. PROPER TAX TREATmENT OF ADVANCE RFNTALS,
SECURiTY DEPOSITS, AND OTHER PREPAYMENTS.
Ordinarily, in the negotiation of a real estate lease, the lessor will re-
quire that the lessee make some sort of prepayment, a payment over and
above the current rent. The particular characterization of that prepay-
ment may make a considerable difference in the tax treatment -to the
parties, particularly in the tax treatment of the lessor, and it is therefore
important that the attorney be aware of -the varying tax impact.
1. Advance Rental Payments
If the prepayment is an advance rental payment - for example, a
payment which, by the terms of the lease, is to be applied in payment of
the last year's rent - then it is dear that the payment is immediately
taxable as -income to the lessor. A long line of cases so holds.
A common sense approach would seem to require that since the lessor
is immediately taxable on the receipt of advance rent, the lessee must
concurrently obtain a rent reduction. That is probably not so, however.
1. The substance of this article is derived from a presentation by the author at the
Cleveland Regional Tax Institute, September, 1958, sponsored by the Cleveland Bar
Association.
2. Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938); Astor Holding Co. v. Com-
missioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943); Detroit Consolidated Theatres v. Commis-
sioner, 133 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1942); Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d
141 (6th Cir. 1949).
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It is fairly well established that the lessee - even a cash basis lessee -
may deduct an advance rent payment only in -the year to which it relates
- in our example, only in the year corresponding to the last year of the
lease.3 Accordingly, a characterization of the prepayment as advance rent
affords the lessee no tax benefit, but it does result in the lessor receiving
a tax disadvantage.
2. Security Deposits
Suppose, however, the prepayment is not referred to in the lease as
advance rent, and is not to be applied as future rent. Instead, it is in fact
a deposit to secure all of the various covenants of the lessee. If the
prepayment is in fact a security deposit, then it is not immediately
taxable ,to the lessor.4 The lessee, of course, will get no immediate deduc-
tion, but in that respect he is no worse off than if the payment were
advance rent.
3. Security Deposits vs. Advance Rental:
Solving the Problem of Characterization
It is easy to conclude that from a tax standpoint -the lessor will or-
dinarily be better off if the pre-payment is characterized as a security
deposit than if it were characterized as advance rent, and that the lessee
is not significantly affected by whichever characterization is made. The
problem is made immeasurably more difficult than that, however, by the
fact that ordinarily the parties will want the prepayment to do double
duty. The lessor will indeed ordinarily want the prepayment to serve
as a security deposit for the lessee's performance, and the lessee will
ordinarily want the security deposit in effect returned to him by way of
application on future rent.
Where, as is usually the case, the prepayment is intended to serve a
double duty, the difficult question is presented as to whether the pre-
payment is intended primarily as a security deposit or primarily as an
advance rent payment. Although there are many cases involving that
determination from the tax standpoint, perhaps the most helpful case
to the draftsman of the lease is the Tax Court decision in John Mantell.6
3. See Reg. § 1.162-11 and Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3d
Cir. 1931). Some doubt is cast on this unfavorable conclusion by the case of Wald-
heim Realty and Investment Company v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir.
1957), in which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that prepaid insur-
ance premiums were deductible by the cash basis insured in the year of payment.
4. George E. Barker, 13 B.T.A. 562 (1928), acq. VIII-1 Cum. BULL. 3; Warren
Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723 (2d Cit. 1940).
5. Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938); Clinton Hotel Realty Corp.
v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942); Astor Holding Company v. Com-
missioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943).
6. 17 T.C. 1143 (1952); Acq. 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
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In Mantell, a ten-year lease required -the lessee to deposit $43,000 as
security for the performance by the lessee of many substantial covenants.
The lessor was not obligated to keep that deposit in a separate account
or to pay interest to the lessee. The lease specifically stated that the
deposit was not to be applied as rent. However, $33,000 of that security
deposit was to be returned to the lessee during the last year of the lease
on five prescribed dates which were only four or five days after the
prescribed dates for rental payments in the last year, and in exactly the
same amounts as those installments of rent. The $10,000 balance of the
deposit was to be returned when the premises were surrendered by the
lessee in accordance with the lease. On these facts, the Tax Court held
that the $43,000 was a security deposit, not advance rent, and therefore
not taxable to the lessor in the year of receipt. One of the most interest-
ing aspects of the case is that it was formally acquiesced in by the
Commissioner.7
Particularly in view of that acquiescence, a lessor's counsel who is
faced with a situation where an advance payment must do double duty
should extract these lessons from the Mantell case:
1. The prepayment should secure substantial covenants -to be per-
formed by the lessee."
2. The lease should nowhere refer to the prepayment as "advance
rent." This is, of course, an easy precaution to observe, but it
is surprising how often the cases come up in which the prepay-
ment has been referred to both as a security deposit and as ad-
vance rent.9
3. The lessor should have no right to apply the prepayment on rent
for any future period.
4. If at all possible, the lessor should not be obligated to return the
deposit until the termination of the lease. If the lessee will not
agree to such a provision, then the obligation to return the de-
posit should specify a return date or dates which do not coincide
with the rental payment dates.
7. 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
8. The opinion in the Mantell case provides a helpful check list in this connection.
The prepayment involved in the Mantell case secured the following covenants of the
lessee, among others: the return of the property in good condition at the end of the
term, payment of the current rentals, replacement of all broken, damaged and missing
personal property included in the inventory attached to the original lease, payment
of all utility charges, keeping in good condition the interior of the premises, the in-
demnification of the lessor against any claim of any kind that might be brought
against the lessor in connection with the lessee's operation of the premises, the assign-
ment to the lessor as additional security for the payment of rent all personalty
brought into the leased premises.
9. See cases cited Note 5 supra.
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In short, there is no reason why the lessor's counsel should not be
able, with careful drafting, to rely on the acquiesced Mantell decision in
order to obtain for his client a postponement of tax liability on the pre-
payment.
4. Bonus Payments by Lessee to Obtain or Modify a Lease
Occasionally, a lessee will pay a sum in addition to the first year's rent
in order to obtain a lease, or after the lease has commenced, will pay
an additional sum to obtain a modification of a lease. Such payments,
from both the lessor's and lessee's standpoints, fall into substantially the
same pigeonhole as advance rents. That is, the lessee may not take an
immediate deduction, but must instead amortize the payment ratably over
,the remaining term of the lease.10 The lessor, on the other hand, must
include the full amount in income in the year received."
An interesting question arises as to the period over which a lessee
must amortize such a "bonus" payment when the lease contains an option
in the lessee to renew the lease. New Section 178 of the Internal
Revenue Code, recently enacted by Congress in 1958, contains an inter-
esting new rule, namely: where -the value of the original term of the
lease is less than 75% of the cost of acquiring the lease and the option
to renew (a situation which indicates that the lessee was paying a sub-
stantial sum for the right to renew) then the lessee must amortize the
cost over the extended period. He may still have an out, however.
New Section 178 of the Code also provides that if at the end of a par-
ticular lease year, the lessee proves that it is more probable that he will
not renew the lease than that he will renew it, then the previously un-
amortized cost may be deducted ratably over the remaining original term.
Where the value of the original term of the lease is 75% or more of
the total bonus payment, then the lessee may amortize the bonus over
the original term, unless the lease has in fact been renewed or at the end
of the particular year the facts show with reasonable certainty that it will
be renewed.
5. Bonus Payments to Terminate a Lease
The cases are not entirely clear as to deductibility by a lessor of a
payment made by him to his lessee to induce him to vacate. When a
lessor pays off his present lessee in order to enter into a more favorable
lease with a third party, common sense would seem to dictate one of two
tax results: (1) either an immediate deduction to the lessor as ordinary
10. Reg. § 1.162-11; Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.
1931); Pig & Whistle Co., 9 B.T.A. 668 (1927).
11. See Renwick v. United States, 87 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1936).
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and necessary business expense, or (2) the amortization of the payment
over the term of the new lease, treating the payment as a cost of acquir-
ing that new lease. The cases, however, seem to hold that the lessor may
treat the payment in neither of those ways. Instead, he must amortize
the payment over the remaining term of the old lease.12 On the other
hand, if the payment is made in order to dear the building, so that the
lessor might demolish it and erect a new building, then there is authority
for the more sensible rule that the payment must be added to the cost of
the new building and recovered through depreciation deductions.18 Those
two lines of cases are seemingly irreconcilable; in all probability, the last
word has not yet been written on this point.
From the lessee's standpoint, the payment received by him to induce
him to vacate gives rise to capital gain, to the extent of the gain realized
'by him, under the dear authority of the Internal Revenue Code.14
When the lessee pays the lessor in order to get out of his lease, the
general rules are somewhat easier to reconcile. The lessee may ordinarily
deduct the payment in its entirety in the year of termination.' 5 The
lessor, the Supreme Court has held, must report as ordinary income in
the year received a lessee's payment to terminate the lease.' 6 This or-
dinary income treatment by the lessor on receipt of a lessee's payment
must be contrasted with the capital gain treatment accorded a lessee when
he receives a similar payment from his lessor.
By way of summary of the prepayments discussion:
1. Advance rents are immediately taxable to the lessor but not
deductible to the lessee until the year they are applied. Security
deposits are not immediately taxable to the lessor and are not
deductible by the lessee unless and until applied. Where a pre-
payment is intended to serve a double duty, careful reliance upon
the Mantell case makes possible an advantageous characterization
for the lessor.
2. Bonus payments by a lessee must be amortized over the period
of -the lease and in some situations over the lease period plus any
renewal periods. Such payments are immediately taxable to the
lessor.
3. Payments by a lessor to terminate a lease must ordinarily be
amortized by the lessor over the remaining period of the old
12. Henry B. Miller, 10 B.T.A. 383 (1928); Harriet B. Borland, 27 B.T.A.
538 (1933).
13. Business Real Estate Trust of Boston, 25 B.T.A. 191 (1932); non-acq. XI-1
CUM. BULL. 8.
14. § 1241.
15. Cassatt v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1943).
16. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
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lease; gain realized by the lessee is taxed at the favorable capital
gain tax rates. Payments by a lessee to terminate a lease are
ordinarily deductible immediately by the lessee and includable im-
mediately as ordinary income by the lessor.
B. AVOIDING TAx TO LESSOR ON IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY LEssE
Where a lease requires the lessee to make capital improvements to the
land, which improvements will revert to the lessor at the end of the term,
the Commissioner has attempted to impose a tax on the lessor either in
the year such improvements are made, or in the year the lease terminates.
The Commissioner's attempts have been predicated on the fact that such
improvements made by the lessee will enrich the lessor, either at the
time the improvements are made, or at the time the lease terminates,
and that such enrichment should occasion a tax payment by the lessor.
The cases and statutes make fairly clear that, with care, the Commis-
sioner's attempts can be frustrated at both points.
Let us consider first the possibility of income to the lessor in the
year in which the improvements are made. In Blatt v. United States,17
the lessee under a ten-year lease was obligated to pay a certain stipulated
rent and in addition, to make substantial improvements to -the land. The
Supreme Court held that the improvements did not constitute additional
rent, in whole or in part, in the year made. The Court stated that the
improvements which were required to be made by the lessee would not
be deemed to be additional rent to the lessor unless the intention that
they be such is "plainly disclosed."
In Brown v. Commissioner,"s the improvements made by the lessee
were expressly stated to be a credit on a certain portion of the rent pay-
able by the lessee, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the lessor realized income in that amount - that is, the amount of
the stated credit - in the year the improvements were made. Under
the terms of this particular lease, stated the court, the improvements
were dearly intended as rent, were therefore within the dictum in the
Blatt case, and would be treated as taxable income to the lessor.
The moral of those two cases appears dear. If the lessee is to be
obligated to make improvements to the land, the lease should not ex-
pressly relate those improvements to the payment of rent. The improve-
ments should not be stated to be in lieu of rent,19 nor should the dollar
rental be stated at a particular gross figure with a credit, or cutback, on
account of the improvements.
17. 305 U.S. 267 (1938).
18. 220 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1955).
19. I.T. 4009, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 13.
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Suppose, however, that the lease calls for no dollar rental, or an
extremely nominal dollar rent, and the lessee is obligated to make im-
provements which are not stated to be in lieu of rent. In such a situa-
tion it would seem that even though the intention is not expressly stated
that the improvements are to be considered rent, the lack of any realistic
dollar rental obligation makes dear that the improvement is intended as
rent within the dictum of the Blatt case. Substantial doubt, however,
is cast on this unfavorable condusion by the recent case of Commissioner
v. Cunningham.20 In the Cunningham case, where the lessor on a five-
year lease received no rent whatever, and the lessee erected $20,000 of
improvements on the land, both the Tax Court and the Appellate Court
held -that the lessor did not realize taxable income either in the year the
improvement was made or in the year of termination of the lease, there
being no indication that the improvement was intended as rent. Aside from
being a borderline case, the Cunningham decision is perhaps distinguish-
able from the more typical kind of situation. In Cunningham, the lessor
was the dominant shareholder in the corporate lessee. It is conceivable
that the improvements were indeed not intended as being compensatory
to the lessor but that on the other hand the shareholder-lessor intended
to donate the use of the land to her corporation. 21 If the lessor and lessee
are unrelated, such a donative intent is not likely.
As a practical matter, whether or not the lessor and lessee are related,
for the lessor to be relatively safe, the lessor should receive some signifi-
cant dollar rent, in addition to the lessee's obligation to improve. In
all probability, however, that dollar rent need not be equivalent to the
fair rental value of the land, so long as it is substantial and is not grossly
disproportionate to that fair rental value. Similarly, the fact that the
improvements will have a useful life longer than the period of the lease
is probably immaterial so long as the lease term is not flagrantly shorter
than the useful life.22
The Commissioner has also attempted to tax to -the lessor in the year
in which the lease terminates the value of improvements made by the
20. 58-2 U.S.T.C., fI 9771 (9th Cir. 1958).
21. It seems that the Commissioner might have argued just the converse intent;
that is, that the corporation intended by erecting a building on the stockholder's land
to make a donative (dividend) payment to the lessor, in the amount of the fair value
of the premises to the lessor at the time of the ultimate termination of the lease. One
factor weighing against such a result, and perhaps the factor which prevented this
possibility from being raised in argument, is that the lessee corporation continued to
rent the premises on a nominal basis after the expiration of the original term of the
lease.
22. Where the lessee's improvements have a useful life longer than the period of
the lease, the question might arise as to the period over which the lessee can write
off the improvements for tax purposes. See the discussion in the text beginning at
page 197 infra.
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lessee. Indeed, he succeeded in that attempt in Helvering v. Braun, de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 1940.23 Congress, however, promptly
overruled the Bruun case by adopting section 109 of the Internal Revenue
Code which expressly precludes, with one exception, the realization of
income by a lessor on the termination of a lease on account of improve-
ments made by a lessee. That exception is simply where such improve-
ments constitute "rent" or as stated in the words of the statute "Gross
income does not include income (other than rent)...." The Brown
case24 and the Internal Revenue Service's own ruling2 5 hold that the
lessor realizes income in the year that the improvements are made when
the lease states that the improvements are in lieu of rent or when an
express cut-back or credit on rent is provided. It is believed that those
authorities are within the dictum in the earlier Blatt26 case where the
Supreme Court stated that the lessor will not be treated as in receipt of
additional rent on account of the lessee's improvements, unless the in-
tention that it be rent is plainly disclosed. If that intention is plainly
disclosed the lessor would presumably realize income in the year the im-
provements are made; if the intention is not plainly disclosed, then it
would seem that the improvements are not rent in any year. It may be
that the only vitality to -that exception in § 109 would exist in the rare
situation where the intention that the improvements be deemed rent is
plainly disclosed, and in addition the improvements are made in the very
year the lease is terminated. Diluted down to that relatively rare situa-
tion, the parenthetical exception to the favorable exclusion in § 109
makes obviously good sense. Surely, if -the making of the improvement
in a particular year would have constituted rental income to the lessor
in that year because it was plainly intended as such, it should not escape
taxation simply because the lease happened to terminate in -that same year.
As a practical matter, it would seem that a situation calling for the appli-
cation of that "rent" exception could exist only when a lease terminated
through repossession.27
By way of brief summary: If the lease requires the lessee to make im-
provements to the land, lessor's counsel should bear in mind the following
caveats:
23. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
24. 220 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1955).
25. I.T. 4009, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 13.
26. 305 U.S. 267 (1938).
27. The Treasury Regulations under § 109 indicate that the "rent" exception re-
lates to the situation where the improvements represent in whole or in part a liquid-
ation in kind of lease rentals, presumably a situation where the lease reserves to the
lessee the ownership of any improvements but where the lessee transfers that owner-
ship to the lessor in payment of back rent. Reg. § 1.109-1 (1956).
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1. The lease should not contain an express credit to a dollar rent pay-
ment or an express cutback in rent on account of the lessees im-
provements.
2. The lease should not refer to the improvements as being in lieu
of rent.
3. The dollar rent should not be merely nominal in amount.
4. The lease period should not be flagrantly shorter than the useful
life of the building.
C. DEPRECIATING LEASEHOLD IMPROVEMENTS
1. Depreciation by the Lessor
Improvements made by a lessor may normally be depreciated over
the economically useful life of those improvements.28 One important and
sometimes overlooked exception to that rule bears mention. If the lease
obligates the lessee not only -to keep the premises in good repair, but
also to restore and replace the premises at the end of the term in as good
condition as they were in at the beginning, the lessor may lose the de-
preciation deductiom29  A nice question is presented as to whether the
lessor would not at least be entitled to an obsolescence deduction, but no
point would be served by dwelling on that question. The dear moral is
that the lessee's obligation to maintain the premises should always ex-
cept ordinary wear and tear, unless -the parties do indeed intend that the
lessee shall rebuild the premises at the end of the term.
2. Depreciation by the Lessee
More difficulty is encountered with the rules relating to depreciation
by the lessee. Where the lessee makes improvements on his leasehold -
and -those improvements are not treated as ordinary income to the lessor 0
- the lessee is entitled to write off the cost of those improvements.
Where the term of the lease is longer than the estimated life of the
improvement, the lessee must depreciate the improvement over its life."1
Where, however, the term of the lease is shorter than the life of the
improvement, so that the lessee is not likely to derive any benefit from
28. § 167; Reg. § 1.167 (a) (4).
29. Georgia Railway & Electric Company v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1935); Commissioner v. Terre Haute Electric Company, 67 F.2d 697 (7th Cir.
1933); G.C.M. 11933, XII-2 CuM. BULL. 52. But cf. The North Carolina Midland
Railway Company v. United States, 58-2 U.S. T.C., 9701 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
30. If the lessee's improvements, when made, constitute income to the lessor, the
lesee's tax treatment would presumably be governed by the rules relating to pre-
payments by lessees. See discussion beginning at page 189 supra.
31. Reg. § 1.167 (a) (4).
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the improvement for a period beyond the lease term, he may amortize the
improvement over the shorter lease term.3 2 It should be borne in mind,
however, that amortization over the lease period, as distinguished from
depreciation over the life of the improvement, must be made ratably in
each year of the lease. The rapid depreciation methods of the 1954 In-
ternal Revenue Code, whereby a disproportionate amount of the deprecia-
tion may be claimed in the earlier years, are dearly not available for
amortization.33
The big question over the years has not centered about the general
rules just discussed, but rather over the subsidiary question of what is the
applicable period of write-off by the lessee when he has an option to
renew the lease or is related in some fashion to the lessor. On this diffi-
cult point let us take a quick look at the regulation, the cases, and new
Section 178 recently added to the Internal Revenue Code. The regula-
tions, surprisingly enough, after citing the renewal option and relation-
ship factors, take the seemingly liberal view that unless the facts show
with reasonable certainty that the lease will be renewed, the lessee may
write off the improvement without taking into account any right of re-
newal.3
4
The Tax Court, however, has done better by the Government than
has the Commissioner.3 5 The Tax Court, it seems, will be satisfied that
there is a reasonable certainty that the lease will be renewed unless the
lessee can prove a reasonable probability that it will not be renewed, a
test substantially less liberal than the one seemingly set forth in the regu-
lations.
That brings us to new Section 178 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Under that new provision, certain specified relationships between the
lessor and lessee will preclude amortization of improvements over a lease
period shorter than the life of the improvement in every instance.3 6 That
new rule is categorical and has at least the virtue of eliminating debate.
Where the parties are not closely related, but the lessee has an option
to renew, then Section 178 provides that if the unexpired initial term of
the lease at the time the improvement is completed is shorter than 60%
of the estimated life of the improvement, then the lessee may amortize
over the remaining years in the original term only when he can establish
32. See Note 31, supra.
33. Reg. 5 1.167(a)(4).
34. Reg. § 1.162-11.
35. Alamo Broadcasting Company, Inc., 15 T.C. 534 (1950); Acq. 1951-1 CUM.
BuLL. 1; Aiken Drive-In Theatre Corp., 15 G.C.M. 684 (1956); Kerr-Cochran, 30
T.C. (1958).
36. The specified relationships for this purpose are, with one slight modification,
the relationships set forth in Internal Revenue Code § 267(b).
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that as of .the dose of the particular year it is more probable that the
lease will not be renewed than that the lease will be renewed. Suppose,
-by way of example, that the lessee completes an improvement to his
leasehold interest at a time when the initial term of the lease has ten
years to run. The lease gives lessee the right to renew for an additional
-ten-year term after the expiration of the initial term. The estimated life
of the improvement is twenty years. Since the unexpired initial term of
,the lease -is only 50% of the estimated life of -the improvement, the
lessee will have to write off .the cost of the improvement over the full
twenty-year period, unless he can establish at the end of a particular tax
year that it is more probable that the lease will not be renewed than
that the lease will be renewed. This new test of "greater probability" is
not far different from the approach currently taken by the Tax Court and
is not likely to put an end to litigation on this troublesome question.
If the unfavorable 60% test is not met, then the lessee may amortize
over the initial term of the lease unless the lease has in fact been renewed
or the facts show with reasonable certainty that it will be renewed. Sup-
pose, by way of example, that in our previous illustration the estimated
life of the improvement is fifteen years rather than twenty years. Since
the unexpired initial term of the lease (ten years) is more than 60%
of the estimated life of the improvement (fifteen years), the lessee will
be able to amortize the improvement over the shorter ten year initial
-term of the lease, unless at the end of the particular tax year the lease
has in fact been renewed or the facts show with reasonable certainty that
it will be renewed.
The depreciation discussion may be summarized as follows:
1. Improvements made by a lessor may normally be depreciated over
the useful life of the improvement. Beware, however, a lease
provision which obligates the lessee to restore -the premises at
the end of the term without excepting ordinary wear and tear.
2. Improvements made by a lessee may normally be written off
over the life of the improvement or the term of the lease,
whichever is shorter. Where, however, the lessor and lessee are
closely related, Section 178 of the Internal Revenue Code will
preclude any write-off over a period shorter than the life of the
improvement. Where the parties are not related, but the lessee
has an option to renew, he must brace himself for the possibility
of litigation if he attempts to write off an improvement over an
initial term of the lease which is substantially shorter than the
life of the improvement.
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